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Empirical research was conducted detailing, ranking, and evaluating operational 
improvement measures in Private Equity. Forty-two operational PE experts were surveyed, 
gauging the relative prioritization attributed to these measures in normal and recessionary 
conditions. Ranking these found a strong focus toward cash preserving strategies in economic 
downturns. Scatter plot analyses crossing evaluation metrics of Potential Money Multiple 
Uplift, Complexity, Delivery Risk, Senior Time Commitment found no clear conclusion on PE 
tendencies toward quick wins or larger plays. Additionally, an operational PE to traditional PE 
historical performance comparison was conducted finding quite consistent outperformance by 
operational PE funds from 2000 – 2017. 
 
Keywords: Private Equity, Operational, Value Creation, Improvement Measures, Recessions 
 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to thank Graham Oldroyd for properly detailing the operational improvement 
measures in question that provided an initial foundation on which to build and show my 
gratitude for his general guidance with the topic.  
I would also very much like to thank Kamarl Simpson of Preqin for the extensive 
collaborative effort on operational to traditional PE fund split and resulting proprietary 




This work used infrastructure and resources funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia 
(UID/ECO/00124/2013, UID/ECO/00124/2019 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209), 
POR Lisboa (LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722 and Social Sciences Data-Lab, Project 




This empirical research addresses both a gap in Private Equity (PE) literature, and 
investigates the lack of transparency on the relatively elusive operational value creation 
strategies in PE, referred to as operational improvement measures. The central research 
question inspiring this work is as follows: 
What are the actual operational improvement measures employed by PE with their portfolio 
companies during the holding period, and which are the most critical in economic downturns? 
The intent is to offer transparency around these measures and understand the way 
operational experts in PE are thinking in diverging economic conditions. In consequence, the 
second research question asks: 
How do operational PE professionals prioritize these operational improvement measures 
based on the frequency of implementation in normal and recessionary conditions? 
To understand how operational and traditional PE funds compare performance-wise, a 
broad historical performance comparison based on net internal rate of return (net IRR) between 
these fund types is conducted. Given the current pandemic induced economic conditions, this 
research also examines:  
How do operational and traditional PE funds compare on performance in different market 
conditions with a specific interest in how each fare during recession conditions? 
Lastly, to achieve greater detail and understanding of the operational improvement 
measures, this research attempts to attach some evaluation assessment and clustering of these 
measures based on the professional opinions of surveyed operational PE experts, with the 
following research question as guidance:  
Do operational professionals, in times of economic downturn, aim for quick wins (low hanging 




This section highlights the conscious research decisions made to set clear boundaries and 
delimit the scope of the study. Collective value creation in PE spans several topics and phases 
of the investment style, and thus, too broad in its entirety for this research.  
A comparative historical performance assessment of operationally inclined PE funds to 
traditional PE funds was achieved through a collaborative effort between the alternative assets 
data and analytics firm Preqin and my proprietary list of identified operational PE funds. These 
funds were classified based on their own statements of operational competence or the presence 
of operating partners with industry experience. Operational strategies and roles that revolve 
around the fund's own operations are not considered in this research, and the distinction is 
paramount.  
Value creation in PE buyouts can be achieved and assessed at various points throughout a 
deal’s timeline. This research does not consider the value created upon entry and exit of the 
buyout. Furthermore, PE value creation is typically attributed to the following commonly 
discussed value creation topics that do not fall within the scope of this research: financial 
engineering, leverage, arbitrage opportunities, investment strategy, information asymmetry, 
asset stripping from a “conglomerate discount effect” (Gottschalg and Berg 2005), 
optimization of capital structure, and deal-making capabilities. This empirical research focuses 
entirely on the value creation stemming from operational improvements during the investment 
holding period. However, nuances of strategic change such as incentivization of management, 
replacing management, the use of operational consultancies, and the speed at which 100-day 
plans are initiated are also not considered here.  The operational improvement measures in 






The following section aims to provide a brief overview of the basics of PE, including; the 
general structure of a PE fund, its processes, a historical snapshot, and the role of operational 
value creation in PE.  
PE is an interesting alternative asset class and a subset within the broader private markets 
and, therefore, not listed on a public securities exchange (Pitchbook 2020, Møller and Sørensen 
2019). Private capital is committed to a fund by Limited Partners (LPs). Given the risk and 
illiquid nature of the assets, fundraising is typically restricted to accredited investors such as 
“pensions and insurance companies, endowments, and high-net-worth individuals” 
(Chaplinsky 2017). The PE funds are managed and incorporated by General Partners (GPs), 
who then draw on these committed funds to typically acquire majority and controlling stakes 
of portfolio companies, typically looking for solid management experience, competitive 
market positions, and consistent cashflows. Controlling stakes mitigate conflicts of interest 
when driving value creating strategies. Despite not being within the scope of this research, an 
important component of the PE practice is leaning on large portions of debt financing provided 
by institutional lenders such as banks to acquire companies with substantial debt leverage, and 
consequently, deleverage using company cashflows throughout the deal. 
PE pioneers were the first to realize the potential within ineffectively managed companies 
with Leveraged Buyouts (LBO) first emerging in the 1980s (Kaplan and Strömberg 2008). 
Then, while public-to-private transactions nearly vanished in the 1990s due to high-profile 
LBO defaults and bankruptcies tied to the junk bond market crash, LBO firms continued to 
buy private companies (Kaplan and Strömberg 2008). Twenty years later, in the mid-2000s, 
the second LBO boom emerged, and public-to-private transactions reappeared (Kaplan and 
Strömberg 2008). 
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A PE investment begins with the sourcing, identification, and evaluation of an attractive 
opportunity. Today, investment rationales cover a multitude of justifications, from 
undermanaged assets with potential, steady and healthy EBITDA growth, strategic and 
competitive market positioning, attractive acquisition prices, and EBITDA to effectively 
deleverage, depreciated distressed assets or restructuring opportunities and general operational 
improvement opportunities to create value. The mention rationales only cover a few of the 
numerous possible justifications for PE investment.  
 A raised fund has a predetermined time horizon of typically 10 – 15 years with the possible 
extension under the Limited Partnership Agreement, exercised in times of unfavorable exit 
market conditions, such as after the Global Financial Crisis (Bain & Company 2019), or 
prevailing value-creation potential (Smith 2019). Typically, capital is deployed in five years 
with the additional years to return the capital to investors (Kaplan and Strömberg 2008). 
Individual investments are typically held for three to five years; however, more than one-third 
of deals are held longer than five years, according to Bain’s PE industry data (Bain 2020). 
Returns in PE are not only generated by smart acquisitions and deal-making at the beginning 
of an investment or solely in the exit opportunities but very much so in the value-enhancing 
strategies—discussed in the theoretical framework—undertaken throughout the period in 
which they are held, which is the focal issue of this research. Such active ownership and 
guidance is achieved by fund GPs taking board of directors seats in order to work hand in hand 
with the management of their portfolio companies (Matthews, Bye, and Howland 2009).  
Portfolio company exits typically fall under four categories. The first is a strategic sale to 
a corporate acquirer looking to realize potential synergies by building scale or adding new 
products and geographies, accounting for roughly two-thirds of total buyout exit value (Bain 
2020). The second most common exit style, and growing in popularity, is sponsor-to-sponsor 
deals (secondary buyouts), in which PEs are on both the buy and sell sides of an exit, 
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accounting for nearly 30% of global buyout value (Bain 2020). The last intended exit is through 
an Initial Public Offering by selling new stock issuance to public investors. Nevertheless, this 
form is becoming less popular as regulation hinders a clean sale of a PE fund’s entire stake in 
the asset, and is apparent in declining IPO exits reaching a 10-year low in 2019 (Bain 2020). 
The very last exit would be in the form of unintended portfolio company bankruptcy.  
Ultimately, GPs are convinced they can outperform public markets with high risk-adjusted 
returns for their LPs (Chaplinsky 2017). In normal economic conditions as well as in the 
context of recessionary conditions, such as that of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 2007 – 
2008, PE has been hailed with new-found appreciation as an interesting and important asset 
class for many investors globally (Aigner et al. 2008, Wollaston and Witte 2020, Bain 2020). 
This can be asserted by the sheer quantity of funding pouring into the industry. They hold vast 
amounts of Dry Powder (deployable capital) as global uncalled private capital is stockpiling 
despite the majority of that capital being younger than two years (Bain 2020), insinuating that 
capital is also readily being deployed. The PE asset class offers resilience in a downturn in 
contrast to public companies. An abundance of access to deployable capital puts PE portfolio 
company investments in a better standing to weather recessionary conditions than non-PE 
backed comparable companies. PE-backed companies receive hands-on and strongly 
incentivized management, access to capital and can maintain a more long-term focus that is 
less distracted by short-term performance targets. Data shows that PE's best returns generally 
follow recessions (Wollaston and Witte 2020), with an even greater performance divide 
between operational PEs and traditional PEs in those times, which is covered in the results 
section.  
This research's investigatory context begins with making the distinction between 
operationally inclined PE funds and traditional PE funds that do not take active operational 
ownership. The theoretical model for making this distinction is using PE fund's public 
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communication of active operational ownership or the manual identification of Operating 
Partners with industry experience. In theory, this effectively indicates those funds that actively 
undertake hands-on improvement strategies with their investments and those that don’t, relying 
on more traditional PE value creation strategies. This theoretical approach is supported by 
prominent work by Morgan Stanley managing directors Matthews, Bye, and Howland (2009) 
on operating partners and thus, operational improvement as the key to value creation, and 
similarly supported by notable researchers in the space, Gompers, Kaplan, and Mukharlyamov 
in their HBR article (2015) studying the backgrounds of PE founders as grounds for 
operational engineering as a fund’s value creation philosophy.  
This distinction provides a basis upon which to compare historical performance returns as 
briefly addressed by this work's delimitations. This work has been inspired by additional 
industry data that finds strong performance divergence between these groups in terms of mid-
recession Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and grave differences in post-recession fundraising 
(Connolly et al. 2020). Such differences in fundraising strongly indicate where LPs are placing 
their future bets.  
Theoretical Framework 
 
PE uses a myriad of mechanisms to create value with their acquired portfolio companies. 
As the previous section highlights, PE comes off a lengthy history of financial engineering and 
arbitrage as a primary area of focus for generating value. During the more recent years of PE, 
increased competition for good deals, abundant access to capital, and the commoditized skill 
of financial engineering have pushed GPs to differentiate by shifting their focus toward 
operational value creation. In a similar fashion, a prevalent consensus—detailed in the 
literature review—finds the growing importance of operational value creation in PE. Rigorous 
research, both academic and industry lead, on countless PE deals and their subsequent value 
creation breakdown have begun exclaiming true operational value creation as the largest 
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proponent of total value creation, accounting for 65% & 69% investment return attribution of 
Top and Second Quartile deals respectively (Vester 2011).  
Thus, the theoretical concepts delineating the scope of this research are narrowed down to 
the truly operationally strategic improvement measures employed by PE during the holding 
periods of their portfolio companies. This encompasses the interventionist strategies employed 
to improve operational efficiencies, preserve cash, expand operations, and grow revenues. 
Oldroyd (2016), a former Bridgepoint partner, proposed a relatively robust list of key 
operational improvement measures, or "areas of focus," which build the foundation of the 
empirical research undertaken.  
Private Equity’s Operational Improvement Measures 
Major Acquisition Integration  Minor Acquisition Integration  Factory Closure / Relocation 
Change Manufacturing 
Process Lean Manufacturing  
Waste Reduction / Right First 
Time 
Energy Use Reduction  Offshoring / Inshoring / Outsourcing  SG&A Overhead Reduction 
Supply Chain Optimization Purchasing Cost Reduction Working Capital Optimization  
Pricing Channel Strategy / Optimization  Sales Force Effectiveness  
Marketing Strategy  Customer First Culture Change  Distribution/ Logistics Optimization  
IT Systems Upgrade  Property Sale / Opco - Propco Pensions, Insurance, Tax 
Financial Reporting And MIS Product Line / SKU Rationalization / Reduction  
Table 1: A compiled comprehensive list of the most commonly undertaken operational value creating improvement 
measures as the areas upon which operationally inclined PE funds focus their interventionist efforts. Comprehensive 
definitions of the list of improvement measures are found in Appendix A 
The last global financial crisis taught PE a great deal leading to expanding operating 
capabilities, with PE funds now employing “30% more operating partners than they had just 
five years ago” (Wollaston and Witte 2020, 2). PE consultancy theories propose operationally 
inclined PE funds to be better prepared to respond to economic dislocation or full recessions 
than other PE funds given their depth of operational and sector expertise (Wollaston and Witte 
2020, 11, Connolly et al. 2020, Bain 2020, Achleitner and Eisenhut 2019). The current timing 
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of a global pandemic induced recession makes for interesting timely research on the true 
prevalence and attributed importance of these operational measures in economic downturns.  
Thus far, no pervasive theories nor models have been developed to test and gauge an all-
encompassing list of operationally implemented value creation measures. Given the deal 
dependent nature of PE, with deals of grave individual differences of investment style, region, 
size, industry, and sector, this study’s empirical research remains quite theoretical. It does not 
attempt to evaluate these operational measures on precise counts of implementation occurrence 
nor exact attributed return values, which I believe would be nearly impossible to effectively 
quantify. To add value academically and create some degree of transparency for the PE 
industry, this research simply attempts to shed light on how operational experts are thinking 
and perceptually gauging at which frequency these improvement measures are employed, 
gauging the divergence of relative prioritization of these measures in contrasting economic 
conditions.  
Without making specific assumptions on the importance of individual improvement 
measures, a focus on revenue generating strategies is expected in normal economic conditions 
and cash preserving strategies in recessionary conditions, as reiterated in hypothesis 2. 
Literature Review 
 
Having presented the conceptual and theoretical frameworks that guide this research, the 
following literature review aims to provide an overview of the prior academic and industry 
lead research in this space. Ample literature and industry reports have been published, with the 
majority investigating PE performance and its measurement. This basis of literature and the 
research questions provide a foundation on which to develop the hypotheses. The most 
prominent topics researched are PE performance, performance consistency, the factors driving 
PE returns, and performance assessment methods as laid out by Gohi and Vyas’s literature 
overview (2016). As a large portion of this existing literature does not pertain to this work's 
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scope, individual nuances pertaining to this research direction are picked out and detailed 
further. 
Notable work that covers general literature in PE includes (Kaplan and Strömberg 2008) 
providing a general overview of what PE is and how it functions and investigates the economics 
of PE and its transactions. Metrick and Yasuda (2011) study what PE managers undertake with 
their portfolio companies, however, focusing on the importance of private ownership, 
information asymmetry, the use of debt, compensation incentivization, and comparisons to 
non-PE backed companies. More recent work by Kaplan and Sensoy (2015) focuses on PE 
Performance, from average returns to risk adjustments, cyclicality, and the links between 
management contracts and fund returns.  
Private Equity Performance Comparison 
PE performance literature generally concerns itself with the comparison between PE funds 
and public markets, such as the work of Vissing-Jorgensen and Moskowitz (2002). Further 
research covers cash flow analysis, returns and risk characteristics of PE, studied by Ljungqvist 
and Richardson (2003), as well as PE qualities such as fund duration and size of investments 
that drive variations of PE returns, finding that small investments outperform large ones 
(Lopez-de-Silanes, Phalippou, and Gottschalg 2015, Vester 2011). Furthermore, Guo, 
Hotchkiss, and Song (2011) quantify the value creation of LBOs from 2005, nevertheless, 
documenting only minimal cashflow gains from increased operating efficiency as pertaining 
to the focus of this research direction, which they, however, attribute to increased tax shields, 
and management discipline due to the presence of debt and better management incentives 
among other elements.  
The more recent history of PE has seen a growing presence and attributed value of 
operational teams within PE and so, operationally inclined PE funds, with larger firms 
progressively expanding in-house operational expertise (Achleitner and Eisenhut 2019, Mullin 
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and Panas 2014, Klier, Welge, and Harrigan 2009, Phillips and Vatsal 2018, Kaplan and 
Sensoy 2015, Alvarez and Jenkins 2007, Grufman and Cotzias, n.d., Vester 2011).  
Persistence of Private Equity Fund Performance 
The persistence of PE performance encompasses another body of literature rigorously 
investigating fund manager abilities to perform consistently. In an overview of the literature, 
Gohil, and Vyas summarize that the evidence of performance persistence is quite mixed despite 
the majority of work finding some notions of persistence (2016). The only literature with 
pertaining relevance to this research is the work of (Kaplan and Schoar 2005), who attribute 
their performance persistence findings to the skill and quality of GPs, which this work 
considers in the form of operational competence.   
Operational Private Equity vs. Traditional Private Equity 
The first two research questions are inspired by the industry-wide increase in operating 
partners as GPs differentiate themselves toward more operational competencies (Wollaston 
and Witte 2020, Alvarez and Jenkins 2007, Grufman and Cotzias, n.d.). Coupled with the 
general notion recognizing the importance of the operational components and competencies in 
PE, this research grapples with the idea that an element of such skill and quality of a GP alluded 
to in the literature has increasing components of operational expertise and their subsequent 
effect on portfolio company value and thus, fund performance. This sets the exploratory 
foundation for developing the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: PE funds with GPs of operational competence or dedicated operational 
value creation teams consistently outperform non-interventionist traditional PE funds in 
all economic conditions 
To measure the performance comparison, the distinction of operational PE funds to 
traditional PE funds is made, and historical performance data on average net IRR values 
collected from Preqin is used, subsequent to a collaborative effort to refine the subset of 
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operational inclined PE funds. A McKinsey article (Connolly et al. 2020), which initially 
inspired this research, explores this particular performance comparison with a more limited 
subset of identified GPs with specialist operational value creation teams and Preqin 
performance data, concluding that GPs with such teams score a higher average net IRR (+5%) 
during recession years than funds without portfolio value-creation teams (Connolly et al. 
2020). 
Methods of Measuring Private Equity Performance 
The literature on the methods of measuring returns does not generally apply here as this 
research only makes a standardized, average net IRR comparison between operational PE funds 
and traditional PE funds. Furthermore, different researched methods of returns measurement, 
such as a risk and return methodology specific to PE funds, proposed by Driessen, Lin, and 
Phalippou (2012), remain at high-level PE returns measurement and not the measurement or 
estimation of risk and return of granular improvement measures. These improvement measures 
are extremely challenging to gather data on and assess given the highly deal-dependent nature 
of the industry and the challenge of assigning risk vs. return to the individual measures.  
Factors Driving Private Equity Returns 
Gohil and Vyas summarize notable literary work on the central factors driving PE returns, 
which include: macroeconomic factors, such as market cycles, GDP growth, interest rates and 
bond yields by (Phalippou and Zollo 2006); fund size, fee structures, and information 
asymmetry by (Marquez, Nanda, and Yavuz 2010); investment strategy and investor 
sophistication by (Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai 2007); and effects of public market 
movement by  (Gompers et al. 2008). Despite the significance of the mentioned research, they 
do not directly apply to this research as they do not cover the interventionist improvement 
measures undertaken during the holding periods of investments. More pertinent research by 
Diller and Kaserer (2004) and Aigner et al. (2008) explores the relationship between GP skill 
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and experience as a precursor to fund performance, similar to the performance persistence 
research by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) previously mentioned. Irrespective of the research 
mentioned here, Gohil and Vyas conclude in their literary overview that there is yet strong 
evidence to be provided to confidently validate “whether superior returns are actually due to 
GP Skill or otherwise” (2016). 
Operational Value Creation 
Narrowing in on this research's central scope, Oldroyd (2016), who proposed the 
comprehensive list of operational improvement measures, highlights the paradox in the 
consensus around the value attributed to operational improvement. Although simply 
understood as "process[es] of making a business run more effectively" (Oldroyd 2016), the 
specifics of these improvements are rarely dissected in detail. As a result, literature pertaining 
to the detailed elements of operational value creation in PE is sparse. Consequently, there is a 
gap left in the academic literature on the detailed nuances of operational value creation, upon 
which this research attempts to simply provide more transparency. Vester (2011), with Ernst 
& Young (EY), provides the most relevant academic research, evaluating 176 of the largest 
North American (NA) PE exits—with complete deal information—to determine how and 
where the value was created. (Vester 2011) 
They found that “more than one-half of total value creation in NA PE exits was due to 
strategic and operational improvements (S&O) in the business” (Vester 2011, 9), with top and 
second quartile deals having the largest fractions of S&O improvement (two-thirds) and solely 
financial engineering value creation levers to only secure third quartile value creation 
performance (Vester 2011, 10). They found that EBITDA growth accounts for more than half 
of S&O value creation, making it the single largest PE value creation lever (Vester 2011, 10) 
Mullin and Panas (2014), for McKinsey & Company, investigate the “black box" that is PE 
operations, clustering operational strategies under "revenue building, cost reduction, and other 
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initiatives." Their 30 surveyed PE funds (fewer than this research) placed importance on the 
revenue building components of sales growth and pricing improvements by anticipated 
company effort and capability building in other initiatives (Mullin and Panas 2014). 
Vester (2011) further categorizes the “value growth outperformance components” under: 
investment strategy, buying, improving, and selling, of which only “Improving” pertains to this 
work. However, amongst value creation strategies as the investment theses, they found that 
“improving the core business” performed the best scoring "13% more value creation growth 
than the collective average (Vester 2011, 12). This encompasses a focus on cash, CAPEX 
management, EBITDA expansion for growth, and cost-cutting (Vester 2011, 12). Nevertheless, 
the “improving” subset of value growth components relates most closely to this research, of 
which “comprehensive business improvement” therein performs best (Vester 2011, 16). The 
individual improvement measures presented in the theoretical framework should not be studied 
in isolation but as components of more all-encompassing deal-by-deal value creation plans 
(Vester 2011). Matthews, Bye, and Howland (2009), with Morgan Stanley, caution with 
regards to business improvement areas that it is important to “sort through a sometimes-
overwhelming number of potential opportunities. Oldroyd (2016), who proposed the matrix of 
measures, says PEs, selective as they are, concentrate on three or four measures with any given 
portfolio company at one time. Attempting more typically overexerts management capacity 
and returns poor outcomes (Oldroyd 2016).  
Vester further dissects the EBITDA growth portion of value creation in his study, finding 
that 3/4 can be attributed to revenue increasing strategies and only 1/4 to cost reductions (Vester 
2011, 10). On a weighted basis, the combined program of cost-reducing and revenue growth 
improvements performs best (+7% above average value creation) (Vester 2011). Revenue 
growth performs on par with average value creation, and solely cost-cutting underperforms 
(Vester 2011). Conversely, a study of operational value creation in Scandinavian PE exits by 
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Møller and Sørensen (2019) concludes that EBITDA growth outpaces sales growth, insinuating 
a strong focus on cost structure.  
Hypothesis 2 is developed in the hopes of providing added clarity on the generalized 
selection and, thus, prioritization of individual operational improvement measures from Table 
1 by PE’s operating professionals and gauges the tendencies toward revenue generating vs. 
cash preserving strategies in differing economic conditions. Much like PE funds rank the 
potential operational improvements per deal (Matthews, Bye, and Howland 2009), this research 
asks that of respondents in a very theoretical and generalized context and thus, hypothesizes:  
Hypothesis 2: Operational PE experts predominately prioritize revenue generating 
measures in normal economic conditions, and conversely, cash preserving (cost-reducing) 
measures in recessionary conditions 
The final portion of this research does not attempt to gauge real performance metrics based 
on the expert evaluations of the improvement measures, but the perceived potential money 
multiple uplift, complexity, delivery risk, and senior time commitment associated with each. 
Operational improvement measures used to be ranked simply by the amount of required capital 
investment, however, this is no longer a sufficient approach (Matthews, Bye, and Howland 
2009). Such an approach neglects the less tangible senior management time and commitment, 
the complexity of the improvement measure, and delivery risk. Oldroyd (2016) also proposes 
these components of evaluation in his matrix of operational improvement measures. 
Hypothesis 3 is derived from the intent to cluster the improvement measures based on the 
previously mentioned evaluation criteria. General clusters expected are quick wins (low effort 
and thus also low value), and larger plays (high effort and commitment and high potential 
value), and a general undetermined middle ground clustering. Hypothesis 3 is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: PE Operational experts will aim for improving working capital and focus 
on quick wins in recessionary conditions. 
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In conclusion of the literature reviewed, it is clear that minimal research pertains precisely 
to this empirical research. Therefore, this work aims to shed light on that gap in the literature 
by simply providing greater transparency on the way current operational experts in PE are 
thinking and how they perceive that operational value creation strategies have been employed 
in normal economic conditions and those that will be employed in recessionary conditions now 
and looking forwards. Perhaps this work can add value in aiding PE funds with the desired 
increase in standardization of an operational playbook, as mentioned by Wollaston and Witte 
(2020) for EY and Matthews, Bye, and Howland (2009) with Morgan Stanley.  
Methodology 
 
Guided by the research questions and hypotheses, this exploratory empirical research 
design has two main components. The first being a data-driven historical performance analysis 
and subsequent comparison between the identified subset of operationally inclined PE funds 
and traditional PE funds —as described in delimitations and conceptual framework sections—
with the help of Preqin data and the collaborative effort of operational fund identification. The 
second, a structured digital survey asking operational PE experts—based on professional 
opinion—to select, rank, and evaluate operational improvement measures in normal and 
recessionary economic conditions.  
To begin, using trial access to sources such as Mergr and Private Equity International, a list 
of global PE funds was compiled manually. Using profile descriptions and the presence of 
operating partners—detailed in the delimitation and conceptual framework sections—certain 
funds were classified as operationally inclined, which would be compared to all others on an 
average net IRR performance basis. My list was conjoined with that of Preqin's, which 
McKinsey used for their research (Connolly et al. 2020) that inspired this work. This list of 
operational PE funds also served as the list of operational experts to survey for the latter portion 
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of this research (42 respondents). A Preqin data pull on the final list of operational PE funds, 
and the rest of the PE industry drew a basis for performance comparison.  
The majority of this work concerned itself with the latter portion of this research design. 
Using the matrix of operational improvement measures proposed by Oldroyd (2016) and the 
evaluation criteria also proposed in the same article, a digitalized logic branching survey was 
designed using the Qualtrics experience management survey platform. A digital online survey 
design mitigates respondents' global distribution and the extremely limited time these 
operational PE experts have. The survey was structured in two intentionally sequential blocks 
asking first considering normal economic conditions with a perspective on the past and, 
secondly, the context of recessionary conditions such as now (2020) looking forwards. The 
conscious decision to not randomize the blocks of normal and recessionary contexts was made 
in order to set an initial baseline of results in which respondents consider the past normal 
economic conditions first, and thereafter, consider how, in the new context of a recession, their 
opinions of perceived prioritization of improvement measures may adapt. The sample of 
respondents stems from the list of operationally inclined PE funds, which predominately 
included experts of operating roles like operating partners or managing directors of said 
operationally inclined PE funds. It is assumed that they are the most suited to provide 
professional opinions on the matters of operational improvement measures undertaken with 
their portfolio companies. 
Relatable research was done by Mullin and Panas (2014) with McKinsey & Company, 
although, with fewer respondents and less globally representative, using the same question 
design asking based on the anticipated use, or in their case, company effort attributed to select 
measures. Respondents were asked to select five of 23 improvement measures, which they 
believe were most frequently implemented until the end of 2019 prior to the Covid-19 induced 
pandemic and subsequent recessionary conditions. A logic branching survey design enabled 
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carrying respondents' selections into the following evaluation questions. Then they ranked the 
five selected from first to last, again in terms of frequency of implementation. They were then 
asked to evaluate the selected measures on potential money multiple uplift, complexity, 
delivery risk, senior executive time commitment, and public perception. As mentioned, the 
second half of the survey asked the same questions; however, in the context of recessionary 
conditions and how these operational experts will then select, rank, and evaluate improvement 
measures in the current economic conditions (2020) and looking forward two years. The 
research design intends to gauge three main elements: the prioritization of these improvement 
measures, the divergence of prioritization between normal and recessionary conditions, and the 
clustering of improvement measures based on the evaluation criteria mentioned. 
The pervasive limitations of this research lie predominantly in the deal dependent nature of 
the PE practice. These range from the individuality of deals, industries, industry compositions, 
sectors, deal sizes, and investment rationales going into deals, such as clear Buy and Build 
strategies, for example. In addition, surveyed operational experts' experience or lack of 
experience with the current fund they are with may skew results based on improvement 
measures employed with only a small sample of past deals. Ultimately, this empirical research 
design remains quite theoretical and simply aims to provide transparency on how operational 
PE experts are thinking with regards to prioritizing operational improvement measures and 
how they perceive the associated value, complexity, and risk of these individual measures.  
Results 
 
Proprietary historical performance data considers the years 2000 until 2017—the most 
recently available Preqin PE performance data—comparing the operational inclined PE funds 
to traditional PE funds, with said distinction already described in the conceptual framework 
section. Much like the data collected through the empirical research survey, the Preqin data 
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split considers Global PE performance data as seen in Figure 1 below, and a North American 
split and a European split as seen in Appendix B & C.  
Operational PE vs. Traditional PE Historical Performance Comparison 
 
Figure 1: The graphic depicts the yearly average NET IRR performance comparison between Operational PE 
funds (Ops) and Traditional PE funds using a collaborative effort in PE fund type distinction with Preqin and 
resulting proprietary Preqin performance data. 
As seen in Figure 1 and Appendix D, the data clearly shows that while the general market 
was still suffering at the beginning of the 2000s, coming off the burst of the dot-com bubble 
and the 9/11 recession, operational PE funds (Ops Average) outperform traditional PE funds 
(Average). In the considered timeframe, NA operational PE funds outperform in 14 of the 18 
years with a total average of plus 2.67 net IRR percentage point (pp) difference and 12 years 
in the EU with a staggering total average of plus 6.56 pp difference to traditional PE. Globally, 
operational PE outperforms by an average of 3.89 pp from 2000 until the onset of the GFC in 
2007. This specific operational PE performance difference until the onset of the GFC is more 
pronounced in NA and the EU with average net IRR pp differences of 5.38 and 7.79, 
respectively. In the years of the GFC (2007 – 2009), the data finds a performance reversal, with 
traditional PEs performing better, and even more pronounced in the EU, with traditional PE 
funds performing better by an average of 2.72 pp in those years. However, immediately after 
the GFC, a larger performance gap is seen with global operational PEs outperforming by 5.85 
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pp, and again, more pronounced in both NA and EU, with operational PEs outperforming by 
7.17 and 10.59 pp, respectively. The years since the GFC and until 2017 saw relatively 
interchangeable years of outperformance between traditional PEs and operational PEs. 
Globally, operational PEs just barely outperformed in the years after the GFC until the end of 
2017, averaging out at 1.77 pp better, whereas in NA only by an average of 0.58 pp, however, 
in the EU by 7.70 percentage points, although, predominately due to an extremely high-
performing outlier year in 2017 for operational PEs in the EU.  
 
Prioritization of Operational Improvement Measures
 
Figure 2: This histogram depicts the relative generalized prioritization of operational improvement measures based on 
the percentage of operational PE experts selecting them to the top 5 most frequently employed in contrasting economic 
conditions – normal up until December 2019 and recessionary January 2020 and for the next two years. 
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The empirical research surveying operational PE experts (42 respondents) provides a 
relative prioritization of operational improvement measures comparing their generalized 
importance in contrasting economic conditions, shown in Figure 2 above. In normal conditions, 
50% of respondents select Sales Force Effectiveness to the top 5 most frequently employed in 
years prior and up until December 2019. Working Capital Optimisation, Pricing, and Financial 
Reporting and MIS are mentioned by more than 42% of respondents, although, Financial 
Reporting ranking better than Pricing within respondents’ top 5 selections. IT Systems Upgrade 
rounds out to the top 5 with 37% mentions. The lower histogram in Figure 2 shows the 
divergence of improvement measures prioritization in recessionary conditions. Here the focus 
shift is readily apparent with SG&A Overhead Reduction claiming the top spot as selected by 
more than 70% of respondents and nearly always ranked 1st in respondents' top 5 selection. 
Working Capital Optimisation remains in second; however, increases in collective mentions 
and ranks better than in normal conditions. Supply Chain Optimisation moves into the top 5, 
selected by more than 50%, and Product Line/SKU Rationalisation/Reduction with nearly 40% 
mentions, which moved the farthest, having ranked 18th in normal conditions. Purchasing Cost 
Reduction, Factory Closure/Reduction, and Sales Force Effectiveness all tie for 5th, with 
rankings also placing them in that order. Factory Closure makes up the most places from its 
15th ranking in normal conditions. 60% of the top ten strategies in normal economic conditions 
classify as revenue generating improvement measures, whereas recessionary conditions find 







Evaluation and Cluster Analysis of Improvement Measures 
Operational PE experts evaluated the improvement measures on metrics of Potential 
Money Multiple Uplift (0.1x – 2.0x+), Complexity (1 – 5), Delivery Risk (1 – 5), Senior Time 
Commitment (1 – 5), and Publicity (-5 – +5). Figure 3 below depicts the graphical scatter plot 
of the improvement measures, with the bubble size and shading representing the relative 
ranking in terms of times selected, presented by Figure 2, also reflecting the differences 
between normal and recessionary conditions. Appendix F further highlights the empirical 
survey result values and means supporting the scatter plot analyses.  
Clear differentiation between quick wins and larger plays is challenging to make with the 
given results. No clear linear relationship between potential value to effort can be deduced as 
proposed by Matthews, Bye, and Howland (2009). As one may expect, recessionary conditions 
marginally increase the mean of all measures except for potential money multiple uplift, which 
decreases slightly. Purchasing Cost Reduction, Pricing, and Working Capital Optimisation 
offer a relatively linear relationship on the front edge of potential value and senior time 
commitment required in normal conditions. Recessionary conditions tighten the cluster of 
prioritized measures around 3 out of 5 for senior time commitment and nearly 0.6x in potential 
money multiple uplift. In recessionary conditions, both Working Capital Optimisation and 
1 Major Acquisition Integration 
2 Minor Acquisition Integration 
3 Factory Closure/Relocation 
4 Change Manufacturing Process 
5 Lean Manufacturing  
6 Waste Reduction/right first time 
7 Energy Use Reduction  
8 Offshoring/Inshoring/Outsourcing 
9 SG&A Overhead Reduction 
10 Supply Chain Optimisation 
11 Sales Force Effectiveness  
12 Marketing Strategy  
13 Purchasing Cost Reduction  
14 Working Capital Optimisation  
15 Pricing  
16 Channel Strategy/Optimisation  
17 Customer First Culture Change 
18 Distribution/Logistics 
Optimisation  
19 IT System Upgrade 
20 Property Sale/OPCO - PROPCO  
21 Pensions, Insurance, Tax 
22 Financial Reporting and MIS 
23 Product line/SKU 
Rationalisation/Reduction 
 
Figure 3: A graphical bubble scatter plot depicting the improvement measures evaluation 
relationship between Potential Money Multiple Uplift and Senior Time Commitment. 
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SG&A Overhead Reduction provide sizable positions of potential money multiple uplift and 
lesser senior time commitment than other commonly employed measures based on their ranking 
(bubble size). Standard deviations of the mean results of the individual measures comparing 
normal and recessionary conditions are not worth any particular notable mention. Further 
cluster analyses comparing relationships between the metrics as mentioned above are shown 
in Appendices G – K. The Publicity evaluation metric was not considered further for scatter 
plot analysis.  
Discussion & Conclusion 
 
Again, it is paramount to stress the limitations of this empirical research given the deal 
dependent nature of PE and the research design based on professional opinions and experience 
gauging the prioritization and evaluation of said measures, which are inherently challenging to 
quantify. 
The historical performance comparison between operational PE and traditional PE does 
show that operational PE outperforms on average. In line with differing market conditions since 
2000, operational PE has proved to fare better in nearly all conditions. The comparative 
performance data does generally support hypothesis 1. The only notable mention for traditional 
PE is its outperformance in the lowest periods of market returns, such as in 2008 during the 
GFC. One may argue that operationally inclined PEs are more susceptible to heavy downward 
market movements; however, it appears to be stand-alone years that traditional PE outperforms. 
The tumultuous years since the GFC until 2017 also show less consistent outperformance by 
operational PE, however, still coming out on top over traditional PE. Interesting will be how 
LPs progressively commit their capital, which McKinsey already strongly indicated in their 
2020 report considering PE in downturns. Given the findings here, and presuming LPs have 
access to similar data, the anticipation of LPs increasingly continuing to commit to operational 
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PE would be supported. Interesting will be future performance data of this sort investigating 
the post-Covid-19 environment.  
A comparable research effort from McKinsey & Company (Mullin and Panas 2014), 
investigating operational improvement measures, finds a similar leading focus on Sales and 
Pricing in normal conditions, ranked 2nd in their study and 3rd in this study. This research design 
takes a similar form to that of McKinsey's, however, with more respondents and additional 
effort in specifically surveying operational experts in PE. This research also adds the 
comparative perspective of normal and recessionary conditions regarding these improvement 
measures (Figure 2), which no other study does thus far. Clear support of hypothesis 2 is found 
in the improvement measures ranking portrayed by Figure 2, validating that focus shifts heavily 
from revenue generating measures in normal conditions (60% of top 10 measures) toward cash 
preserving measures in recessionary conditions (70% of top 10 measures), also portrayed and 
labeled in Appendix E. 
Hypothesis 3 is only in part supported, as respondents confirm the heavier importance of 
Working Capital Optimisation in recessionary times, with more respondents selecting it, and 
of those, more ranking it higher in their top 5 selection. Although, Working Capital 
Optimization is deemed a revenue generating strategy in normal conditions to foster future 
growth, in recessionary conditions it is more of a cash preserving strategy, providing a liquidity 
buffer for tough economic times, also noted in the footnote of Appendix E. As alluded to in the 
results, a clear clustering of quick wins (low effort/low-value strategies) or larger plays (high 
value/high effort strategies) is not very conclusive. In recessionary conditions, portrayed in the 
right scatter plot of Figure 3, and those in Appendices G – K, a differentiated clustering is less 
apparent as improvement measures of worthy mention consolidate around relatively similar 
potential money multiple uplift and senior time commitment. The data provides no clear 
indication favoring quick wins in recessionary conditions, nor the opposite.  Generally, the 
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cluster analyses crossing the different evaluation metrics simply emphasizes the value of 
SG&A Overhead Reduction, Purchasing Cost Reduction, Financial Reporting, and Working 
Capital Optimisation with their relatively lower general complexity, delivery—
implementation—risk, and senior time commitment, while delivering solid potential money 
multiple uplift in contrast to other often-mentioned improvement measures. These are 
visualized in Figure 3 and Appendices G – K and numbering legend Appendix L.  
The results of this research further validate the presence and importance of operational 
value creation competencies in PE and provide a generalized improvement measure ranking in 
differing economic conditions and high-level PE internal evaluation in terms of value, effort, 
complexity, and risk. 
 
Directions for future research and academic contribution 
 
This empirical research on the growing operational presence and competencies in wider PE 
attempts to provide transparency on several topics, and thus, offering an academic contribution 
to the existing gap in the literature detailing the operational improvement measures and 
subsequent insight for PE industry players interested in the significance of operational expertise 
in differing economic conditions. Perhaps the proposed findings can offer a theoretical 
benchmark toward which other operationally inclined PE funds can compare the use and 
prioritization of their operational value creation improvement measures.   
Future research could greatly benefit from more recent PE fund performance data and thus, 
further expand on the operational PE vs. traditional PE dissection and comparison. Further 
research could expand on LP commitment tendencies between these fund types. A strong shift 
in LP tendencies may very well sway how PE funds position themselves competence wise for 
future fundraising and thus, adapt in-house competencies. It will be very interesting to gauge 
the years following the current Covid-19 induced economic environment and investigate how 
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Operational Improvement Measure Descriptions and Labelling
Improvement Measures Short Descriptions Revenue Growth vs. Cash Preserving 
Major Acquisition Integration Large scale acquisition and integration with portfolio company to acquire market share, talent, IP, infrastructure etc
Revenue Growth
Minor Acquisition Integration Smaller caliber acquisition typically in a more fragmented market and often part 
of a buy and build strategy
Revenue Growth
Factory closure/relocation Freeing up capital via either heavily reducing fixed infrastructure or strategically 
relocating necessary infrastructure to reduce distribution distances
Cash Preserving
Change manufacturing process Large scale revamping of manufacturing process to drive down costs, modernize 
and automate more processes, strive for six sigma and retain manufacturing 
flexibility
Cash Preserving
Lean Manufacturing Trimming down a typically infrastructure heavy often outdated manufacturing 
process that reacts slow to changes in demand and innovation readiness
Cash Preserving
Waste reduction/right first time Improving the development, speed to market with products and reduce 
prototyping stages necessary to reduce wasted capital via material, time and 
manufacturing
Cash Preserving
Energy use reduction Strategies and technologies to reduce general energy use consumption in 
development, processes, transportation, and manufacturing processes
Cash Preserving
Offshoring/Inshoring/Outsourcing Strategic relocation of select activities and business processes to either cheaper 
locations elsewhere or closer proximity for reduced distances and select skills
Cash Preserving
SG&A overhead reduction Freeing up capital by proactively reevaluating the composition of overhead costs 
attributed to Selling, General & Administrative functions
Cash Preserving
Supply chain optimisation The collective optimisation of inventory, distribution, manufacturing and 
transportation to ultimately minimize operating expenses
Cash Preserving
Sales Force Effectiveness Programs, processes, initiatives and strategies to improve sales results to directly 
drive revenue growth and boost EBITDA growth 
Revenue Growth
Marketing Strategy Revamping marketing strategies to target new customers/clients, retarget, 
generate or initiate recurring sales to drive EBITDA growth
Revenue Growth
Purchasing cost reduction General strategic reduction in procurement and other purchasing costs such as via 
supplier bidding and reevaluating purchasing cost focus and supplier 
relationships
Cash Preserving
Working capital optimisation Optimising the effective use of financial resources and stable cash flows to either 
reinvest or free up cash for increased liquidity 
*Revenue Growth in Normal Conditions
*Cash Preserving in Recession Conditions
Pricing Conscious pricing improvements that enable relatively rapid margin expansion Revenue Growth
Channel strategy/optimisation Often in conjunction with marketing, the channel(s) in which customers/clients 
are reached and through which sales are made and revenue is driven
Revenue Growth
Customer first culture change Better customer experience drives more revenues thus, shift toward more 
customer centric culture improves sales, engagement and recurring revenues
Revenue Growth
Distribution/logistics optimisation Often technological, data, and modelling driven optimisation of distribution and 
logisitics to cut costs and save time
Cash Preserving
IT System upgrade Upgrading general IT infrastructure for business processes, data management, 
security, accounts management etc.
Revenue Growth
Property sale/opco-propco Cash earning through property sale or division of operating company and 
property plus assets owning company allowing financing issues to remain 
separate and reap certain holding tax benefits
Revenue Growth
Pensions, insurance, tax Cash saving via strategic tax, pension and insurance planning and practices Cash Preserving
Financial reporting and MIS Financial and Management Information Systems reports help keep oversight of 
the financial health of the portfolio company 
Cash Preserving
Product line/SKU rationalisation/reduction Reevaluting some or all product lines to potentially rationalize and reduce breadth 






























Operational PE vs. Traditional PE Historical Performance Comparison Data
 
Global Operational PE vs. Traditional PE Returns Comparison
Average of NET IRR (%) Ops Average of NET IRR (%) Difference in PE Returns (% points)
2000 13.67 14.99 1.32
2001 17.93 28.74 10.81
2002 18.00 24.93 6.94
2003 18.94 22.94 4.00
2004 14.65 17.09 2.45
2005 10.39 13.86 3.47
2006 8.58 10.48 1.89
2007 11.13 11.40 0.27
2008 13.04 11.68 -1.36
2009 14.41 13.01 -1.40
2010 14.25 20.09 5.85
2011 14.61 10.84 -3.77
2012 17.01 17.33 0.32
2013 13.99 17.16 3.18
2014 16.35 16.18 -0.17
2015 15.15 15.75 0.59
2016 20.42 16.75 -3.67
2017 11.72 23.58 11.86




North American Comparison Difference in PE Returns (% points)
Average of NET IRR (%) Ops Average of NET IRR (%)
2000 12.14 14.49 2.36
2001 14.49 30.75 16.26
2002 12.50 20.54 8.04
2003 11.01 18.74 7.73
2004 10.95 14.15 3.20
2005 8.32 10.67 2.35
2006 8.34 10.41 2.06
2007 11.91 13.04 1.13
2008 14.49 12.52 -1.96
2009 16.34 18.63 2.29
2010 15.75 22.92 7.17
2011 14.87 10.11 -4.77
2012 15.91 17.96 2.05
2013 15.43 18.38 2.95
2014 17.30 16.99 -0.31
2015 15.84 16.81 0.97
2016 24.75 18.59 -6.16
2017 14.07 16.83 2.76




European Comparison Difference in PE Returns (% points)
Average of NET IRR (%) Ops Average of NET IRR (%)
2000 15.95 20.99 5.04
2001 21.20 26.65 5.45
2002 23.45 56.50 33.05
2003 28.35 31.35 3.00
2004 16.76 29.27 12.50
2005 13.15 14.59 1.44
2006 8.36 12.49 4.13
2007 10.14 7.82 -2.32
2008 10.61 10.39 -0.22
2009 15.17 9.56 -5.61
2010 12.76 23.35 10.59
2011 17.25 17.95 0.70
2012 14.02 17.51 3.50
2013 12.89 18.54 5.65
2014 16.65 14.77 -1.88
2015 16.32 13.37 -2.95
2016 12.77 11.02 -1.75
2017 9.41 57.16 47.75



































Normal Economic Conditions Recessionary Economic Conditions
Ranking (1-10)
Operational Improvement Measures Revenue Generation vs Cash Preservation Ranking (1-10)
Operational Improvement Measures Revenue Generation vs Cash Preservation 
1 Sales Force Effectiveness Cash Preservation 1 SG&A overhead reduction Cash Preservation
2 Working capital optimisation Revenue Generation* 2 Working capital optimisation Cash Preservation*
3 Pricing Cash Preservation 3 Supply chain optimisation Cash Preservation
4 Financial reporting and MIS Cash Preservation 4 Product line/SKU rationalisation/reduction Cash Preservation
5 IT System upgrade Cash Preservation 5 Purchasing cost reduction Cash Preservation
6 Purchasing cost reduction Cash Preservation 6 Factory closure/relocation Cash Preservation
7 Channel strategy/optimisation Revenue Generation 7 Sales Force Effectiveness Revenue Generation
8 SG&A overhead reduction Revenue Generation 8 Channel strategy/optimisation Revenue Generation
9 Major Acquisition Integration Cash Preservation 9 Financial reporting and MIS Cash Preservation
10 Supply chain optimisation Revenue Generation 10 Major Acquisition Integration Revenue Generation
Generation vs Preservation count in top 10 Generation vs Preservation count in top 10
Preservation 4 Preservation 7
Generation 6 Generation 3
Top 5 Top 5
Rank 1 Revenue Generation Rank 1 Cash Preservation
Rank 2 Revenue Generation* Rank 2 Cash Preservation*
Rank 3 Revenue Generation Rank 3 Cash Preservation
Rank 4 Cash Preservation Rank 4 Cash Preservation
Rank 5 Revenue Generation Rank 5 Cash Preservation
* Argue that Working Capital Optimisation is a Revenue Generating strategy in normal econoomic conditions to free cash flow to fund future growth













Mean Values of Evaluation Metrics of Improvement Measures: Normal Economic Conditions
Complexity Delivery Risk Senior Time Commitment Publicity Potential Money Multiple Uplift
Major Acquisition Integration 4.00 3.91 4.64 0.91 1.52
Minor Acquisition Integration 3.50 3.00 3.83 2.33 0.79
Factory Closure/Reduction 3.20 4.20 3.40 1.40 0.83
Change Manufacturing Process 4.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50
Lean Manufacturing 3.13 2.63 3.00 1.25 0.66
Waste Reduction/Right First Time 3.50 2.50 3.50 2.50 0.50
Energy Use Reduction - - - - -
Off-shoring/In-shoring/Outsourcing 3.75 3.75 3.75 -2.50 0.50
SG&A Overhead Reduction 2.33 1.78 2.56 -1.22 0.44
Supply Chain Optimisation 3.25 2.88 2.75 0.63 0.43
Sales Force Effectiveness 2.94 2.47 3.18 0.94 0.69
Marketing Strategy 3.17 2.67 3.17 2.50 0.71
Purchasing Cost Reduction 2.40 2.00 2.30 -0.50 0.49
Working Capital Optimisation 2.46 2.00 2.62 -0.38 0.57
Pricing 2.43 3.21 2.86 -1.14 0.69
Channel Strategy/Optimisation 3.82 3.50 3.73 0.91 0.66
Customer First Culture Change 4.00 3.25 4.50 3.75 1.00
Distribution/Logistics Optimisation 2.75 3.25 2.00 0.00 0.69
IT Systems Upgrade 3.93 3.86 2.79 0.93 0.49
Property Sale/OPCO-PROPCO 2.00 2.00 3.00 0.00 0.25
Pensions, Insurance, Tax 1.00 2.00 3.00 -1.00 0.15
Financial Reporting and MIS 2.29 1.69 2.86 0.93 0.53
Product Line/SKU Rationalisation/Reduction 3.00 3.00 2.50 0.00 0.33
Mean 3.04 2.75 3.04 0.56 0.61
Std Dev 0.78 0.83 0.80 1.44 0.28
Mean Values of Evaluation Metrics of Improvement Measures: Recessionary Conditions
Complexity Delivery Risk Senior Time Commitment Publicity Potential Money Multiple Uplift
Major Acquisition Integration 4.75 4.50 4.75 1.25 1.44
Minor Acquisition Integration 3.40 3.60 3.60 0.80 0.36
Factory Closure/Reduction 4.00 3.92 4.08 -3.50 0.76
Change Manufacturing Process
Lean Manufacturing 2.67 2.67 3.00 1.00 0.67
Waste Reduction/Right First Time 3.00 3.00 2.00 0.00 0.50
Energy Use Reduction 2.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 0.15
Off-shoring/In-shoring/Outsourcing 4.00 4.25 3.75 -2.33 0.85
SG&A Overhead Reduction 2.36 2.18 2.91 -1.59 0.57
Supply Chain Optimisation 3.27 2.93 3.20 0.20 0.55
Sales Force Effectiveness 3.20 2.80 3.00 1.63 0.43
Marketing Strategy 2.00 1.67 3.67 3.00 0.88
Purchasing Cost Reduction 2.33 2.56 3.00 -0.44 0.41
Working Capital Optimisation 2.83 2.89 2.72 -0.33 0.50
Pricing 3.33 3.33 3.33 -2.00 0.50
Channel Strategy/Optimisation 4.00 3.86 4.14 1.29 0.79
Customer First Culture Change 3.67 2.33 4.00 2.33 0.55
Distribution/Logistics Optimisation 3.25 3.00 2.75 0.25 0.38
IT Systems Upgrade 2.33 3.00 2.33 0.67 0.22
Property Sale/OPCO-PROPCO 1.67 2.33 2.33 -1.00 0.55
Pensions, Insurance, Tax
Financial Reporting and MIS 3.40 2.80 4.00 0.00 0.73
Product Line/SKU Rationalisation/Reduction 3.08 3.33 3.17 -0.83 0.57
Mean 3.07 2.95 3.18 0.16 0.59











































































1 Major Acquisition Integration 
2 Minor Acquisition Integration 
3 Factory Closure/Relocation 
4 Change Manufacturing Process 
5 Lean Manufacturing  
6 Waste Reduction/right first time 
7 Energy Use Reduction  
8 Offshoring/Inshoring/Outsourcing 
9 SG&A Overhead Reduction 
10 Supply Chain Optimisation 
11 Sales Force Effectiveness  
12 Marketing Strategy  
13 Purchasing Cost Reduction  
14 Working Capital Optimisation  
15 Pricing  
16 Channel Strategy/Optimisation  
17 Customer First Culture Change 
18 Distribution/Logistics 
Optimisation  
19 IT System Upgrade 
20 Property Sale/OPCO-PROPCO  
21 Pensions, Insurance, Tax 
22 Financial Reporting and MIS 
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